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THE SOUTH CAROLINA VALUED POLICY STATUTE
AND THE APPORTIONMENT OF PROCEEDS
FROM THE INSURANCE OF LIMITED
INTERESTS IN REAL ESTATE

H. SIMMONS TATE, JR.*
Introduction
There has always been a considerable dilemma involved in
insurance law when the named insured recovers an amount
in excess of the value of his ownership interest in the "thing"
insured.' On the one hand, the view which is traditional
with the courts is that the insured has made a personal contract of indemnity with the insurer, and therefore only he

should benefit from the contract. But on the other hand, it
is recognized that in the eyes of most people, insurance stands
in the place of the thing destroyed, and, therefore, the argument is made that anyone who had an interest in the property
destroyed has an interest in the proceeds of the insurance also.
Yet, it has always been very difficult to assimilate these notions of what the rights of third persons should be with traditional modes of legal thinking. Therefore, in every state
there is a body of law dealing with apportionment of insurance proceeds. This paper will deal with the law of South
Carolina.
It should be noted, however, that this problem arises only
when the insured has recovered more than the value of his
interest in the property insured.2 In 1943, New York prescribed a new form of fire insurance policy, the 1943 New
York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 3 which purported to
limit the recovery of the insured to the value of the insured's
interest, regardless of the face amount of the policy. Thus the
question arises: could an occasion ever occur when this policy
is used where it would be necessary to apportion the proceeds?
This paper, therefore, considers two problems. First, in
what circumstances could the named insured recover more
*A.B., Harvard College, 1951; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1956;
Associated with Boyd, Bruton & Lumpkin, Columbia, S. C.
1. Comment, 19 U. CHI. L. Rav. 112 (1951).
2. Comment, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 354, 370 (1953).
3. N. Y. INSURANCE LAW § 168; PATTERSoN, INsuRAN C 760 (3rd ed.
1955).
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than the value of his interest in the property?

Second, if

there are circumstances in which he could recover more than
the value of his interest, how should the proceeds be apportioned between the named insured and third persons who are
interested in the property insured but who are not parties to
the insurance contract?
In order to answer these questions, the writer has first
examined the South Carolina valued policy statute4 and compared the two insurance forms5 in use during the period when
most of the decisions involving the valued policy statute were
rendered. Then, the paper considers the effect of the valued
policy statute on the 1943 "interest" policy. And finally, concluding that the valued policy statute precludes the insurance
companies from taking advantage of the "interest" limitation
in the policy form, this paper discusses four basic property
relationships, viz., life tenant - remainderman, mortgagormortgagee, vendor-vendee, and lessor-lessee, and the extent to
which apportionment of proceeds is permitted to persons in
those relationships by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The New York StandardFirePolicy Forms: 1917 and 1943
In order to understand the South Carolina valued policy
statute and the decisions interpreting it, the two standard
insurance policy forms which were in use when most of the
decisions were rendered should first be compared. Most of
the cases involving the valued policy statute also involve the
1917 New York Standard Fire Policy Form. This standard
form was first used in New York in 1917. Under this policy,
the named insured was insured "to the extent of the actual
cash value.., of the property," "to an amount not exceeding
Dollars."' 6 There was a further provision that
if the interest of the insured were less than "unconditional
and sole ownership," or if the subject matter were a building
not owned by the insured in fee simple, the policy would be
void.7 Although a waiver could be attached to the policy waiving the condition of sole ownership, s no provision was in the
standard form itself permitting the insurance of divided or
limited interests, nor was there any provision limiting lia4. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 37-154. This statute is
reproduced in the Appendix to this paper.
5. 1917 New York Standard Form and 1943 New York Standard
Form.
6. PATTERSON, INSURANCE 781 (1st ed. 1932).
7. PATTERSON, INSURANCE 782 (1st ed. 1932).

8. Comment, 48 Nw. U. L. REV. 354, 355 (1953).
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bility to the value of a limited interest in case the waiver was
attached. Thus, when property was insured, the assured or
person taking out the policy, had to be the owner of all the
"interests" in the property. The "interest" of the insured
and the "property" insured were synonymous. This is the
most important thing to remember about this policy form
for the purpose of this paper: in case of a total loss, the
question could never be raised that the recovery of the insured should be less than the face value of the policy, because
if the value of the interest of the insured were less than
the face value of the policy, the policy was void and there
could be no recovery at all; and if the company had waived
this provision there was nothing in the policy form which
limited the liability of the insurer to the value of the interest
of the insured. 9
Another feature of this policy, sometimes designated the
"res" policy, was that it resulted in considerable overinsurance. This was because of the reluctance of courts in many
states to find that the policy was void for lack of unconditional and sole ownership. 10 Courts would either find that the
clause did not apply, or that the ownership interest of the
insured satisfied the policy provision. There was a tendency
of courts to interpret the policy liberally, against the insurance company. The result was that frequently when property was insured, the insurer had to pay amounts in excess
of the value of the interest of the insured."
9. But see Brant v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co. of Greensboro, 179 S. C. 55,
183 S. E. 587 (1935). Dictum in this case indicates that a mortgagee

who had insured mortgaged property in the amount of $1,000 could recover no more than his mortgage debt. It is not stated in the opinion
whether the policy was a "res" policy. Perhaps the dictum of the Court

can be explained by the reluctance of the Court to permit a windfall

to the mortgagee. The policy was not treated as a valued policy, and
quaere whether the dictum would state good law if it were not so easy

to determine the value of the insured's interest in the property.

Cases of this type in South Carolina and other jurisdictions are

characterized in Comment, 48 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 354, 355 (1953), as attempts by the courts to limit recovery to the insured's insurable interest
in cases where by the strict terms of the contract, there should be no
recovery at all. The limitation of liability would, therefore, seem to be
something difficult for an insurer to raise in litigation, but a factor

nevert'biess present in negotiations for settlement.
10. E. g., Perkins v. Century Ins. Co., 303 Mich. 679, 7 N. W. 2d 106
(1942); Scott v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 102 S. C. 115, 86

S. E. 484 (1915).
11. But see note 9 supra, and a few cases decided prior to the 1917
New York Standard Form, e. g., Ulmer v. Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 61 S.C.
459, 39 S.E. 712 (1901) (discussed infra, p. 253 et seq.) and Simmons &
Bishop v. American Fire Ins. Co., 94 S.C. 366, 77 S.E. 1108 (1913).
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These disadvantages eventually led to the adoption of the
1943 New York Standard Fire Policy Form. It was approved
by the South Carolina Insurance Commissioner for use in
South Carolina in 1944.12
The approach of the 1943 policy form was different from
the approach of the 1917 form. The insurer, under the 1943
.. . to the extent
form, insured "--(named insured)
of the actual cash value of the property at the time of the
loss, but not exceeding . . .nor in any event for more than
the interest of the insured."'8 (Emphasis added.) Thus, it
was the "interest" of the insured which was protected, not
the "thing" itself. This permitted the insurance of a large
range of interests, less than sole and unconditional ownership,
which was possible under the old policy form only by a special
waiver. And it also purported to limit recovery of the insured
to the value of the insured's interest in the property, although as will be seen later in this paper, it was not successful when the policy was construed as a "valued" policy.
This policy is known as the "interest" policy.
It must be observed that under this policy, in contrast to
the "res" policy, there is every opportunity for the insurer
to raise and the court to consider whether the recovery of
the insured should be the full face amount of the policy, assuming a total loss. This is because if the insurer claims that
the insured's interest is less than the value on the face of the
policy, it has a defense by the terms of the policy itself, thus
forcing the court to determine the value of the insured's
limited interest. Under the "interest" form, every policy
potentially involves a decision as to the value of the insured's
"interest"; whereas under the "res" form, few cases involved a decision as to the value of the insured's "interest".
Now that we have examined the policy forms which form the
background for most of the litigation concerning the valued
policy statute, let us now proceed to the statute itself and the
decisions interpreting it.

Valued Policy Statute of South Carolina
Before discussing the valued policy statute of South Carolina 14 and the cases decided under it, it is perhaps necessary
first to explain the difference between a "valued" and an
12. C. C. H. INS. L. REP. 2005.
13. PATTERSON, CASES 760 (3rd ed. 1955).

14. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 37-154.
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"open" policy of fire insurance. In the early case of Cox,
Maitland & Co. v. CharlestonF. and M. Insurance Co.,15 Judge
John Belton O'Neall defined a "valued" policy as a policy
"where the value of the subject matter is agreed upon, by the
parties" and an "open" policy as one in which "it is not estimated at any particular amount or rate." Many years later, in
Riggs v. Home Mutual Fire ProtectionAssociation,'6 the Court
defined a "valued" policy as "one in which the amount payable
in case of loss is fixed by the terms of the policy itself, as
where property is insured, valued at or 'worth' a specified
amount." An "open" policy was defined as one in which "the
amount of the liability is left 'open,' to be determined according to the actual loss, either by agreement of the parties, or
upon proof in compliance with its terms."
The valued policy statute of South Carolina provides as
follows:
No company writing fire insurance policies, doing business in this State, shall issue a policy for more than the
value stated in the policy or the value of the property to
be insured, the amount of insurance to be fixed by the
insurer and insured at or before the time of issuing the
policy. In case of total loss by fire the insured shall be
entitled to recover the full amount of insurance and in
case of a partial loss the insured shall be entitled to recover the actual amount of the loss, but in no event more
than the amount of the insurance stated in the contract.
But if two or more policies are written upon the same
property they shall be deemed and held to be contributive
insurance and if the aggregate sum of all such insurance
exceeds the insurable value of the property, as agreed
by the insurer and the insured, each company shall, in
the event of total or partial loss, be liable for its pro rata
share of insurance. Nothing in this section shall be held
to apply to insurance on chattel or personal property.
Valued policy statutes were passed in many states, beginning in Wisconsin in 1874,17 in order to prevent the possibility of overinsurance and also to prevent uncertainty as
to the amount of recovery in case of loss. According to the
theory of the valued policy statutes, the insurer would be
15. 3 Rich. 331, 332 (S. C. 1832).
16. 61 S. C. 448, 458, 39 S. E. 614, 618 (1901)
17. See PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 118 (1935).
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bound by the value placed on the property by the insurance
contract and would not be able to contest such a valuation.
Insurance agents, paid by commission, had frequently been
tempted to persuade unwary persons to insure their property
for a greater value than it had, thus encouraging overinsurance. It was thought that if the insurer were required to
be bound by the valuation put on the property by the insurance contract, and if the insurer were thus not allowed to
allege that the property was overvalued, the insurance companies would be more careful in the selection of insurance
agents and would guard more effectively against overinsurance. 18 The success of valued policy statutes in eliminating
overinsurance is considered doubtful. 19
Another policy of the statute, however, apparently more
successful than the first, was the prevention of uncertainty
of recovery. It was considered inequitable for an insurer to

collect premiums based on a high valuation of the property,
then when the property was destroyed, defend on the ground
that the property was overvalued. To prevent this, and thereby to make certain the amount of the insured's recovery in
20
case of loss, the valued policy statutes were passed.
The South Carolina General Assembly passed the valued
policy statute quoted above in 1896. One of the first cases
to come before the Court concerning its interpretation was a
case prior to the adoption of the "res" policy. 2 1 It was Ulmer
v. Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. 22 In that case a building contractor
insured a building which he had contracted to erect. The insurance was "against all direct loss or damages by fire . . .
to an amount not exceeding $450." Later the building was
totally destroyed by fire. In a suit on the policy, Mr. Ulmer,
the contractor, recovered only $82.92, being the amount still
18. See Reilly v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 449, 455-456, 28 Am.
Rep. 552, 555 (1877) ; Dean, Valued Policy Laws I, in YALE READINGS ON

293-298 (1914).
19. Heald, Valued Policy Laws II, in YALE

INSURANCE

READINGS ON INSURANCE

298-303 (1914).
20. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Norris Bros., Inc., 109 F. 2d 172, 174 (4th
Cir. 1940) ; Parnell v. Orient Ins. Co., 126 S. C. 198, 199, 119 S. E. 191
(1923); Bruner v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 165 S. C. 421, 426,
164 S. E. 134, 135 (1932).

21. The policy quoted in the opinion seems to be the New York Standard Fire Policy (Original), effective in 1887 in New York. This form
is found in PATTERSON, INSURANCE 786 (1st ed. 1932). Although the language is somewhat different from the 1917 policy form, it is a "res"
policy in that there is no limitation on the insurer's liability to the value
of the interest of the insured.
22. 61 S. C. 459, 39 S. E. 712 (1901).
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to be paid him by the owner for whom he was building and
also a small amount for extra work. In other words, the insured recovered the value of his "interest" in the building. The
plaintiff appealed, alleging that the policy, by virtue of the
valued policy statute, 23 was a "valued" policy and that he was
entitled to recover the entire $450. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Chief Justice McIver, rejected this
view. It pointed out that the policy did not have the attached
slip, "usual" since passage of the valued policy statute, which
stated the agreed value of the property; that there was nothing in the policy to show that the property was valued at
$450; and that therefore the plaintiff could recover only the
amount of his loss, viz., the amount due him under the contract, plus compensation for extra work. Thus the Court interpreted the statute as permitting a valued policy, if there
was in fact a stated and agreed valuation of the property in
the policy. A reading of the statutory provisions 24 would indicate that this is a logical result because there seems to be
nothing in the statute which requires only valued policies to
be issued, nor is there anything which would seem to require
that a statement of the amount of insurance constituted a
valuation of the property. However, if this result had been
followed strictly, the purpose of the valued policy statute to
encourage certainty of recovery would have been thwarted.
It should also be noted that the Court seems to assume that
in a valued policy, it is the physical object insured which
is valued, not the property interest of the person taking out
the policy.
The principles for which the Ulmer case stands have virtually passed out of existence in South Carolina. 25 As indicated, this writer thinks that Ulmer stands for two propositions. The first is that a valued policy is one which has a
stated valuation of the object insured, separate from the
amount of the insurance. However, by 1955, in Hunt v. Gen23. The valued policy statute in effect when the case was decided
(1901) differed somewhat in wording from the valued policy statute now
in effect. See 61 S. C. at 463, 39 S. E. at 713. But the two statutes are
substantively the same except for recovery in case of partial loss.
24. 61 S. C. at 463, 39 S. E. 713.
25. So far as this writer can determine, it has been cited only once
since it was decided, in Sammons & Bishop v. American Fire Ins. Co.,
94 S. C. 366, 77 S. E. 1108 (1913). And it was cited in that case only
for the proposition that a building contractor had an insurable interest
in the house he is building.
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which apparently carried no separately stated valuation of
the property as a valued policy, the "value" being the face
amount of the insurance in the policy. And there was no
discussion on this point at all.
The second proposition, somewhat related to the first, is
that the "property" which is valued in a valued policy is not
the same as the "interest" of the insured, but instead is the
physical object sought to be protected. But by 1955, again
in the Hunt case, the Court's holding was based on the view
that the "interest" of the insured and the "property" valued
were the same.
The transition between the two cases is difficult to follow.
Much of the language of the cases is consistent with both
Ulmer and Hunt. As to the problem of what constitutes a
valued policy, many cases can be found in the South Carolina
Reports which deal with insurance policies which carry a
stated valuation of the subject matter insured, separate and
distinct from the face amount of the policy. 27 However, Riggs
v. Home Mutual Fire ProtectionAssn., 28 decided in the same
term as Ulmer, indicates that a policy is valued if the property is "insured ... at' a specified amount. Apart from this
case, this writer has been able to find no case which deals
explicitly with the problem of what is required to make a
policy a valued policy.
As to the problem of whether the "property" valued is
something different from the "interest" of the insured, this
writer has also been able to find no other case which explicitly deals with this question, although some of the language in the cases is consistent with the Ulmer view that
"property" and "interest" are different. However, before

the adoption of the "interest" policy, there was at least one
case which seemed to indicate that the "interest" of the
insured was the "property" which was valued. 29
26. 227 S. C. 125, 87 S. E. 2d 34 (1955).
27. Parnell v. Orient Ins. Co., 126 S. C. 198, 119 S. E. 191 (1923);
Columbia Real Estate & Trust Co. v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 132
S. C. 427, 128 S. E. 865 (1924); Walker v. Queen Ins. Co., 136 S. C. 144,
134 S. E. 263 (1925); Aiken v. Home Ins. Co., 137 S. C. 248, 134 S. E.
870 (1925); Bruner v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 165 S. C. 421,
164 S. E. 134 (1932); Fowler v. Merchants' Fire Assurance Corp., 172
S. C. 66, 172 S. E. 781 (1933); Murdaugh v. Traders & Mechanics Ins.
Co., 218 S. C. 299, 62 S. E. 2d 723 (1950).
28. 61 S. C. 448, 458, 39 S. E. 614, 618 (1901).
29. See Milhous v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 161 S. C. 96, 159
S.E. 506 (1931).
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The reason that this question of the meaning of "property"
in the statute did not arise, i. e., whether "property" meant
"interest" of the insured, was that, except for a few rare
instances when the Court acted to prevent a windfall,3 0 there
was never an opportunity for the Court to consider this question prior to the adoption of the 1943 "interest" form in
1944. This was because, as explained earlier, the 1917 policy
form permitted only the insurance of the full interest, and
no insurance of limited interests was permitted. If the "interest" of the insured were less than sole and unconditional
ownership, i. e., if the "interest" were less than co-extensive
with the valuation of the property itself, the policy was declared null and void. The result of this was that when the
"property" was valued by an agreement between the insurer
and the insured, this value was final regardless of the actual
value of the insured's interest. Thus, unless the insurer challenged the policy altogether as being void, which was often
unsuccessful, 31 there was no opportunity for the insurer to
resist payment of the entire amount of the insurance on the
grounds of a limited interest. Therefore, the question of

how to value a limited interest when there was an agreed
value placed on the "property" to be insured never arose in
South Carolina until after 1944.
It is true that under the older policy form it was possible
to add a rider which permitted the insurance of limited interests. Thus, it was possible to a limited extent for persons with
less than unconditional and sole ownership to insure their
interests. But still if the policy were issued to one with less
than sole and unconditional ownership, the insurance company could not limit its liability to the value of the limited
interest. It had no provision in the policy so limiting its liability. It had waived the condition by which it could defend
on the ground that the policy was completely null and void.
And it had no other alternative than to pay the entire amount
of the insurance. Thus again there was no opportunity for
the courts to pass on the question of whether the "property"
which is valued in a valued policy is the same as the "interest" of the insured.
This was the situation during the interval between Ulmer
and Hunt, most of which was prior to the adoption of the
30. See notes 9 and 11 supra.
31. Comment, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 354, 359 (1953).
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1943 policy form in 1944. Apart from the Ulmer case, the
decisions had not touched squarely on the problems which
were to be raised by the 1943 policy form, viz., whether a
policy without a separate valuation of the property is a valued
policy; and whether the "property" valued is the same as the
"interest" of the insured. Before these questions were answered, it was impossible to know to what extent the 1943
policy form would be successful in achieving the object for
which it was adopted, which was to limit the liability of the
insurer to the value of the insured's interest.
But although it was difficult to determine just what effect
the valued policy statute would have on the "interest" policy,
one thing was certain. In South Carolina, contrary to the situation in other states, where policies are adopted by statute,
the valued policy statute clearly takes precedence over a policy

form approved by the Insurance Commissioner.
It would seem that two possible approaches could have
been taken by the Court with regard to the new policy form.
The first approach the Court could have adopted was to have
gone back to the Ulmer case and revived the distinction between the "property" insured (meaning tangible physical
object) and the "interest" insured (meaning insurable interest). If the Court had taken this approach, it would have
permitted a valuation to be placed on the property, and would
have used this as a basis for calculation of the exact value
of the interest of the insured and therefore would have permitted recovery of no more than this ascertained interest of
the insured. This approach was taken in earlier cases by the
Louisiana Supreme Court 32 and the Ohio Appellate Court. 33
But the course the Court did take in fact in the Hunt case
was foreshadowed by dicta of earlier cases. 34 The Court took
the "property" as meaning the "interest" of the insured, so
that the insurer, despite the words of the 1943 Standard
Form, can not contest the valuation placed on the interest by
the policy itself. One of these cases was the 1950 Supreme
32. Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499,
146 So. 38 (1932); Chambers v. North British and Mercantile Ins. Co.,
175 So. 95 (La. App. 1937); Lyles v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 182 So.
181 (La. App. 1938).
33. Summer v. Stark County Patron's Mutual Ins. Co., 63 Ohio App.
369, 26 N. E. 2d 1021 (1940).
34. See Milhous v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 161 S. C. 96, 159
S. E. 506 (1931); Murdaugh v. Traders and Mechanics Ins. Co., 218
S. C. 299, 62 S. E. 2d 723 (1950).
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Court case of Murdaugh v. Traders and Mechanics Ins. Co.35
That case dealt with whether or not two insurance policies
had been written on the same "property" in order to bring
the contributive insurance provision of the "valued policy"
statute into operation. The Court held that "property" as
used here meant the same thing as "interest" of the insured,
and since the second policy was written on the mortgagee's
interest, the mortgagor could recover in full for the loss of
his interest.
The Court finally ruled squarely on the question of the
effect of the valued policy statute on the "interest" policy
36
in the case of Hunt v. General Ins. Company of America.
This case involved insurance procured by life tenants in the
amount of $8,000. The remainderman also insured with the
same company for $3,000. A partial loss occurred. All parties
stipulated after the loss that the building was worth $11,000
and the loss amounted to $1,290.45. The life tenants and remainderman could not agree on how to apportion the proceeds of insurance. The remainderman sued the insurer. The
insurer then tried to interplead both the life tenants and the
remainderman in the same suit. This interpleader suit was
dismissed. Then the life tenants sued the insurer. The trial
judge awarded the remainderman, in an initial trial, $922.67,
that being the proportion of the total loss represented by what
the trial judge calculated to be the remainder interest. Then
the trial judge awarded the life tenants a recovery for the
full amount of $1,290.45. The insurer appealed the second
award. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief
Justice Baker, held that the stipulation as to the value of
the building made after the loss had no effect whatever as
to this policy because the policy was a "valued" policy, fixing
the "valuation of their [life tenants'] interest in the residence at $8,000. ' ' 37 It admitted that a case of overinsurance
was presented, but held that because of the valued policy
statute, the insurance company was bound by the valuation
made. Thus it permitted a recovery in full of the amount
of the loss to the life tenants. In a final paragraph, the
Court pointed out that it was not concerned with the policy
or recovery of the remainderman.
35. 218 S. C. 299, 62 S. E. 2d 723 (1950).

36. 227 S. C. 125, 87 S. E. 2d 34 (1955).
37. 227 S. C. at 129, 87 S. E. 2d at 36.
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Mr. Justice Oxner dissented.3 8 His dissent is based on the
assumption made in the Ulmer case, although that case is not
cited, that there is a difference between the "property" and
the "interest" of the insured, to which the recovery is limited by an "interest" policy. Therefore, Justice Oxner would
have limited the life tenants to the proportion of the total loss
represented by their life interest in the property or $367.78.
The Hunt case has two strange aspects about it. In the
first place, one would assume that in view of the Murdaugh
case, the separate interests here of the life tenants and remainderman are separately insurable and are to be valued
separately. Therefore, under the valued policy statute, each
party could have recovered in full up to the valuation of the
interest placed on the property by the policies.

In

other

words, if the life tenants can recover the full $1,290 because
they can recover in full up to $8,000, it would seem that the
remainderman could recover up to her valued interest of
$3,000. The Court indicated that it was not foreclosing that
possibility and had the remainderman appealed, she might
have recovered the full amount. The only difficulty with this
is that the $1,290 was fixed by all parties as the physical loss,
not the loss of each separate interest. Thus to reach the result that would seem indicated by the case, one has to assume that the $1,290 represented the loss of each interest
instead of the physical damage to the building. It should be
remembered that this was a partial loss, not a total loss. 39
38. 227 S. C. at 134, 87 S. E. 2d at 38.
39. Prior to an amendment of the valued policy statute in 1947, recovery in case of a partial loss was the fixed or stated value of the property, less salvage value, but in no event more than the amount of the
insurance. Bruner v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 165 S. C. 421,
164 S. E. 34 (1932); Fowler v. Merchants Fire Assurance Corp., 172
S. C. 66, 172 S. E. 781 (1933). These cases were decided under the
wording of the statute which read, "the insured shall be entitled to
recover . . . a proportionate amount in case of partial loss." CODE OF
LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1932 § 7977.
The present statute reads "in case of a partial loss the insured shall
be entitled to recover the actual amount of the loss, but in no event more
than the amount of the insurance stated in the contract." CODE OF LAws
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 37-154. This amendment to the statute
would apparently be intended to take partial loss out from under the
valued policy statute altogether. But the decision in the Hunt case does
not so hold and treats the post-1947 statute as if it made no change in
previously existing law. A partial loss is as much under the valued policy
statute by this decision as a total loss. This case has been criticized on
this point. See 7 S. C. L. Q. 665 (1955); 8 S. C. L. Q. 45 (1955).
In the instant case, the "actual amount of the loss" was fixed at
$1,290, and therefore recovery in that amount was permitted. Presumably, the remainderman could also have recovered $1,290, as her policy
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But the unexplainable feature of the opinion is this. The
opinion quoted large portions from the trial judge's decree.
In fact, it incorporated practically the entire decree as the
opinion of the court. Yet the trial judge, when he had the
situation before him in the first instance, as the Supreme
Court did not, refused to follow the logic of a full recovery
to the life tenants, for he granted only a partial recovery to
the remainderman. In other words, the trial judge seems not
to have been consistent in allowing a full recovery to the life
tenants and only a partial recovery to the remainderman, if
the basis for the full recovery is what this writer believes it
to be, and what seems to him to be indicated by the decision of the Supreme Court. One explanation is possible,
however. Perhaps the trial judge valued the loss to the remainderman's interest as only $922, and the loss to the life
tenants' interest as $1,290. These valuations would seem
more in accord with the valuations placed on the interests by
the insurance company ($3,000 for the remainderman and
$8,000 for the life tenants). Furthermore, since the remainderman was the mother of the life tenants, and the life tenants
held for the life of their mother who was also their grantor,
it is reasonable that the interest of the life tenants would be
greater than that of the remainderman.
The other difficulty with this case is what should be done
with the proceeds. This problem will be taken up in a subsequent part of this paper.40
Perhaps it is to a certain extent moot to discuss which
approach should have been taken by the Court, but in view of
the fact that the majority of American courts have not passed
on the question, 4 ' perhaps a few remarks will be helpful. Mr.
Justice Oxner's views have much to recommend themselves.
As pointed out earlier, his approach is taken in Louisiana,
and by the Ohio Appellate Court. 42 Furthermore, the statute
and the policy provisions themselves seem, on their face, to require this result.43 The statute speaks only of "property"
and it may be contended that "property" means to most people
would have been a valued policy too, unless the trial judge's result can
be supported on the ground that in case of partial loss, recovery is limited to the "actual amount" of the loss to the insured's interest, and that
in the trial judge's opinion this was only $922. See text at p. 260 infra.
40. P. 263 infra.
41. See Comment, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 354, 359 (1953).
42. See notes 32 and 33 supra.
43. See the text of the statute in Appendix.
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and probably to the legislative draftsmen the physical object
insured. Furthermore, there has traditionally been a policy
in the law against wagering, and not permitting an insurer to
contest the overinsurance encourages what is technically a
wagering contract. Other arguments might be made that the
policy provisions of the contract require insurance only on the
interest of the insured, 44 and that an interpretation to permit
the insurer to limit liability to that interest will, in the long
run, reduce insurance rates.
In opposition to these arguments are those which bolster
the view taken by the majority of the Court. In the first
place there is the policy of the valued policy statute itself,
the need not necessarily for prevention of overinsurance as for
certainty in the amount of recovery. To permit the insurer to
refuse to pay full recovery because of a limited interest,
might be very disadvantageous to the insured, and the fact
that the insured has been paying a full premium for complete
coverage will not put equity on the side of the insurer, especially when the insurer's agent knew of the limited interest.
It may well be asked what harm there is to the insurer when
the overinsurance possibility might be investigated by the

agent, and the company has been collecting premiums based

45
on the larger amount of insurance.
Furthermore, although one may recognize that most people
think of "property" as the physical object insured, this is not
its meaning in a legal sense. The word "property" in a legal
sense means very little unless it describes a relation between
a physical object and the rights of a person in that object.
Therefore, it seems to this writer that the word "property"
as used in the statute should mean only the interest of the
assured in the physical object, and that the Supreme Court
was clearly right in the Murdaugh case in so holding.
Thus it seems that since there is a "value policy statute"
in South Carolina, the decision of the majority of the Supreme
Court in the Hunt case is correct in that it executes the policy
of the statute better than the opinion of Mr. Justice Oxner.
One may debate the advantages and disadvantages of the

44. The insurer may well argue that not to limit recovery to the value
of the insured's interest is in effect imposing on the parties a contract
different from the one which they entered into. But it may well be
questioned, in view of the fact that the contract is a printed form required by the Insurance Commissioner to be used, to what extent there
was, in fact, a meeting of the minds as to this point.
45. See Comment, 48 Nw. U. L. R.v. 354, 363 (1953).
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statute, 40 but given the existence of the statute, it seems the
duty of the Court to enforce the policy of the statute in the
face of an insurance contract provision which would abrogate
it. And, as between the insurer and the insured, the equities
seem to this writer to be on the side of the insured in cases
of overinsurance, despite the "public policy" against wagering. The public policy against wagering' 7 was developed in
part at least to protect the insurer against the risk of
an insured burning his property and collecting more than
his loss. In view of the fact that the insurer himself has
agreed, however, on a valuation of the property insured, it
does not seem proper to let him claim, after a loss, that the
property was overvalued.
In conclusion, therefore, it seems that the South Carolina
Supreme Court has adopted the view that when a valuation
is made in an insurance policy, such a valuation is a valuation
of the interest of the insured in the tangible physical object. 48
When a partial loss occurs, the insured is able to recover the
amount of the loss up to the value of the interest as agreed.
And when there is a total loss, the insured can recover the
full amount of the agreed valuation. The insurer is not permitted to object that the insured's interest is49worth in fact
less than the amount agreed upon in the policy.
The next question that arises is what happens to the proceeds in the hands of the insured and what rights do third
persons, with interests also in the tangible physical object
insured, have with respect to the proceeds? This will be
taken up in the next section.
Apportionment of Proceeds
The problem of apportionment of proceeds can never occur
except when the insured has recovered an amount which is
46. See Excerpt from 31st Massachusetts Insurance Report in YALE
READINGS IN INSURANCE at

303 (1914).

47. See, e. g., Abraham v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 187 S. C.
70, 78, 196 S. E. 531, 534 (1938).
48. Even after the Hunt case it should not be readily assumed that
if a case were presented of as obvious an overinsurance as was presented in Brant v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co. of Greensboro, 179 S. C. 55, 183
S. E. 587 (1935), the Court would permit a full recovery. Probably, in
the case of the insurance of a mortgagee's financial interest, the insurer would take precautions to have the amount of insurance decrease
with the decrease in the mortgage debt.
49. Apparently, the insurer is "estopped" by the statute from protesting overvaluation of the insured's "property" (i. e., "interest") even
if the insurer did not know of the insured's limited interest, unless the
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more than the value of his interest in the insured object. 0
When would this ever occur? First, the insured might recover
more than the value of his interest if the insurer did not contest the valuation of his interest, but rather, either through
ignorance of the limited interest or through a public relations
policy of the insurance company, permitted the insured to recover the full amount of the policy. Second, as this writer
reads the South Carolina cases under the valued policy statute,
the insured can recover the full amount of the policyr' regardless of the true value of his interest, because by statute
(and decision) the insurer may not contest the agreed valuation placed on the "property" (which means "interest")
by the insurer and insured. Thus there may be many instances in which the insured could recover from the insurer
an amount in excess of the value of his interest, and the problem of how to divide the proceeds becomes important.
The reason that it becomes important to decide upon a
division of the proceeds stems from a solution to the second
major problem raised in the writer's mind by the Hunt case.'
In that case the Court found in effect that the insured's interest was worth $8,000 because of the agreed valuation, and
therefore the insured could recover the full amount of the
partial loss. The question raised is this: if this is the agreed
insurer is able to show fraud or concealment on the part of the insured.
Although there is no exemption in the statute for fraud, fraud or con-

cealment is a ground for the avoidance of the policy. 1943 N. Y. Standard Fire Insurance Policy Form in PATTERSON, INSURANCE 762 (3rd

ed. 1955). Quaere whether the insurer could, in case of fraud, not go as
far as claim an avoidance of the policy, but only argue that the liability
should be limited.
The holding in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bates, 213 S. C. 269,
49 S. E. 2d 201 (1948) indicates that the Court will permit avoidance
of an insurance policy only in cases where there was an intent to defraud or deceive the insurer.
50. Comment, 48 Nw. U. L. Rav. 354, 370 (1953).
51. In case of a partial loss, however, the insured can recover only the
"actual amount of the loss." CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARoLINA, 1952 §
37-154. As indicated by footnote 39, it is doubtful whether this means
the "actual amount" of the loss to the tangible physical object insured
or the "actual amount" of the loss to the insured's interest. The writer
has been able to find no case directly in point, but it would seem that
the former was meant, as this is more consistent with the purpose of
the valued policy statute to insure certainty of recovery by placing the
value of the insured's interest beyond question.
If the Court takes the former approach, the problem of apportionment would occur even in the case of a partial loss. But if the Court
takes the latter view, the problem of apportionment would not occur
since the insured would not have recovered an amount in excess of his
interest.
52. See text at p. 260 supra.
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valuation of the insured's interest, would any third person
not a party to the insurance contract ever be able to recover
part of the proceeds which represent damage to that interest?
The answer, this writer thinks, is that the third person is
not bound by the valuation placed on the property interest
by the insured and insurer, nor is a third person bound by a
decision that as between insurer and insured, the insured
is recovering simply what he is entitled to, viz., indemnity
for damage to his interest.5 3 As between insured and a third
person, the insured has recovered a sum which may be well
in excess of the value of the insured's interest, and then it
becomes appropriate for the parties to divide the proceeds,
if the third person has a right to any of the proceeds under
54
the law.
An examination of various relationships will be made and
this writer will attempt the extent of the rights of a third
person in proceeds recovered by an insured in excess of the
value of his interest.
Life Tenant-Remainderman. The majority of American
courts hold that when the life tenant insures and recovers the
full proceeds of the insurance, the life tenant is under no duty
to account for any part of the proceeds to the remainderman.
South Carolina has, however, a different rule. Two
early cases set the precedents, the first of which resembled
the Charles Dickens case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in time consumed and property involved. 51a These cases were Clyburn
0 and Green v. Green.57 Since the Green case
v. Reynolds,G
involves fewer issues than the Clyburn case, I shall discuss it.
Mrs. Lucy P. Green died in 1864 leaving a town house and lot
in Columbia to her daughter, Lucy, for life, remainder in
fee to Mrs. Green's four sons. Miss Green insured the premises, and the property was later completely burned. She col53. See 30 Am. Jun., Judgments §§ 223-226 (1939).
54. The fact situation which is presented by the Hunt case is somewhat
-unusual because both the life tenants and the remainderman had policies
with the same company. In such a case, as indeed in any situation where
all persons with interests carried insurance, it is doubtful that one who
bad already recovered from an insurance company can proceed against
another who had recovered, for a part of the proceeds in the other's
hands. The fact that the plaintiff in such a case had already recovered
once might be enough to bar an action against the other insured. Such
a bar might be analogous to an "estoppel."
55. Comment, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 112, 115 (1951).
55a. See DICKENS, BLEAK HousE.
56. 31 S. C. 91, 9 S. E. 973 (1889).
57. 50 S. C. 514, 27 S. E. 952 (1897).
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lected $3,000 from the insurance company in 1878. By very
shrewd investments in a bankrupt brick factory and a defunct judgment, Miss Green converted this by the time of
the suit to a $30,000 mortgage and two houses and lots. The
plaintiffs, heirs at law of the original remainderman, brought
a bill in equity to have a trust of the property for their benefit declared by the court. The trial judge referred the issue
to a Master in Equity for a decision, and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court the order of reference. (The
defendant first answered raising new matter, which was ordered stricken by the Judge in his order of reference on motion of the plaintiffs. In the appeal from this order, the defendant tried to interpose a demurrer to the complaint, but
the Supreme Court denied this motion.) The Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Pope, held that the trial judge
was correct in referring the case to a Master, as the plaintiffs
were entitled to a trial on the merits. The Court, citing Clyburn v. Reynolds, said that public policy imposed a quasi-trust
duty on a life tenant for the benefit of the remainderman. It
went on to say that when there was a duty to insure property
for the benefit of another (as there was here because of the
quasi-rust relationship), the person who had the duty to insure must hold the proceeds of the insurance in trust for the
beneficiary. This means that the proceeds must be used to
rebuild, or they must be put out at interest, the life tenant
receiving the income for life, remainder to the remainderman.
Therefore, in the instant case, there was a trust which had
to be declared by the Court. The Court did not say how much
of the rather large amount would be held for the remainderman. 58
This case, raising a trust for the remainderman of the
proceeds of insurance, is a rather firmly established case in
South Carolina jurisprudence. However, to what extent
would it be followed today under the valued policy statute and

an "interest" policy? The Hunt case distinguished Green's
parent, Clyburn, by saying that the case did not involve an
"interest" policy and that there was no showing the insurer
knew of the insured's limited interest when the contract was
entered into.59 Yet, if this writer reads the Hunt case cor58. It would seem that the question of how much would be impressed

with a trust would depend upon ordinary principles of trust law, i. e.,
the extent to which the accretions to the $3,000 were principal.
59. 227 S. C. at 134, 87 S. E. 2d at 38.
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rectly, these two distinguishing characteristics make no difference. Even if, in the Clyburn and Green cases an "interest"
policy had been involved, such a policy would not have been
effective, at least after the valued policy statute, to limit the
insurer's liability, and therefore the life tenant in the Green
case could still have recovered the full amount of $3,000 and
this would still have been held in trust for the remainderman.
And apparently the decision in Hunt did not turn on the fact
that the insurer had notice of a limited interest in the property.0 0 Furthermore, the Court says,6' "The insurance company paid the full amount of the policy to the life tenant,
but as between the life tenant and the remainderman, the
life tenant stood in the position of trustee to the remainderman as to his particular portion of the proceeds." [Emphasis
added.] If the insurer pays the full amount of the policy
to the life tenant, either because the insurer fails to defend,
or because the valued policy statute defeats him, it would
seem that the same fiduciary relation between the parties
would exist as under the Green and Clyburn cases. For, as
between the life tenant and remainderman, no binding judicial decree has established the value of the life tenant's interest. To say this is to say in effect that the statute does not
place a value on the interest of the life tenant as to all the
world. It only "estops" the insurer from asserting a smaller
interest (or the life tenant from asserting a larger interest)
and is binding only between life tenant and the insured.
It is this writer's opinion, therefore, that the Clyburn and
Green cases are still law in South Carolina. The doctrine was
reaffirmed in Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.0 2 and applied
to the proceeds in the hands of the insurance company. However, it is only by regarding the law in the Hunt case as one
of "statutory estoppel" that the two cases, Green and Hunt
can be reconciled, since Green proceeds on the theory that
the proceeds stand for the building and the Hunt case seems
at first blush to assume that the proceeds stand for the insured's interest. The Hunt case must be taken to mean that
the proceeds stand for the insured's interest only as between
insurer and insured, and that as between the life tenantinsured and the remainderman, they stand for the building
60. See also note 49 supra.

61. 227 S. C. at 134, 87 S. E. 2d at 38.
62. 175 S. C. 42, 178 S. E. 254 (1935).
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and a trust is imposed. 63
It must be pointed out further that the foregoing discussion has been based on the assumption that there has been
no requirement to insure imposed by the deed or will creating
the estates, as has been suggested. 64 If such were the case,
the Court would probably take the approach indicated in the
mortgagor-mortgagee cases, infra.
Mortgagor-mortgagee. The cases dealing with a mortgagormortgagee situation seem to be based on concepts similar
to but not exactly the same as the concepts in a life tenantremainderman situation. It will be remembered that the
Green case stated that as a general rule where there was a
duty of one party to insure for the other, the other would
have an equitable right to the proceeds received by the insured. This concept is equally applicable in the mortgage
field. The case of Swearingen v. HartfordFire Ins. Co.65 first
established the principle in South Carolina that where a mortgagor has a duty to insure for the benefit of the mortgagee,
whether that duty is raised by the mortgage contract "or
otherwise," and the mortgagor takes out insurance in his own
name, the mortgagee has an equitable lien on the proceeds
of the insurance. Note here the similarities and differences
between the life tenant-remainderman situation and the
mortgagor-mortgagee situation. In one there is a "quasitrust," raised apparently regardless of any agreement to insure for the remainderman's benefit. In the other, there is
an "equitable lien," which can be used apparently either
against the insurance company or against the mortgagor, but
which arises only when there is a covenant to insure. But
both are equitable devices, raised by the Court to mitigate
the rigors of the personal contract theory which would have
cut the third person not a party to the contract out com66
pletely.
The Swearingen case's enunciation of an equitable lien was
actually dictum, for the holding was that on the facts, no
such equitable lien was raised. And furthermore, in a subsequent case arising out of the same fact situation, Swearingen
63. Although there has been no decided case on the situation, the language of Green and Clyburn indicates that the same result would be

reached if the remainderman was the party insuring.
64. Comment, 48 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 354, 375 (1953).

65. 52 S. C. 309, 29 S. E. 722 (1897).
66. For an analysis of the personal contract theory see Comment, 19
U. CM. L. REv. 112 (1951).
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v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,67 the Court said that the lien extends to the proceeds of an insurance policy only if the
insurer has knowledge of the lien. This raises the problem of
what is the result if the insurer did not have knowledge and
has not paid out the proceeds.
If the object of extending the lien only to those insurers
with knowledge of the lien is to protect a company that has
paid without knowledge, the rule would seem fair and correct,
similar to payment of the original obligor before notice of an
assignment by the obligor to an assignee. And if the money
has been paid to the mortgagor when there is a duty for the
mortgagor to insure for the mortgagee, it would seem that
the mortgagor would hold these proceeds for the benefit of
the mortgagee. This result is supported by O'Cain v. Langston.08 In that case the mortgagor covenanted to insure for
the benefit of the mortgagee. In fact, the mortgagor's husband took out the policy, although he had no insurable interest
(other than the interest of a spouse in the property of his
wife which is enough, in some jurisdictions, to support an insurance policy).69 The insurer paid the proceeds to the mortgagor's husband. (There is nothing in the opinion as to
whether the insurer had knowledge of the covenant to insure.) In holding that the mortgagee could reach the proceeds in the hands of the mortgagor's husband, the Court said,
"the case stands precisely as if the policy had been written
in the name of [the mortgagor], and the [mortgagee] has
an equitable lien on the proceeds of the policy. 7 0
A statement in a case involving a life tenant-remainderman
situation, Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,7' would support
this view:
While recognizing . . . that a contract of fire insurance
is a personal contract between the insurer and the insured and does not run with the building insured, and is
not an incident to the thing insured, the Supreme Court
of this State has held that where the insured occupies
the relationship of trustee, or quasi trustee, toward an67. 56 S. C. 335, 34 S. E. 449 (1899).
68. 125 S. C. 294, 118 S. E. 534 (1923).
69. E. g., ICludt v. German Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 637, 140
N. W. 321 (1913).
70. 125 S. C. at 297, 118 S. E. at 535.
71. 175 S. C. 42, 51, 178 S. E. 254, 258 (1935).
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other, the Court will hold him accountable for the proceeds of the insurance on the ground of public policy.
Thus, if the proceeds are held by the insurer, the Court in
Swearingen said that they were subject to a lien only if the
insurer had knowledge of the covenant. Since the proceeds
are subject to a lien if paid to the insured, it would seem
logical that if the proceeds have been paid to no one the proceeds are subject to a lien in the hands of the insurer, even
if the insurer has no knowledge of the covenant. Crook seems
authority for this statement. Therefore the problem of knowledge becomes important only when the insurer has paid the insured, and for some reason, e. g., insolvency, the mortgagee
does not proceed against the insured mortgagor and sues the
insurer instead.
What constitutes sufficient knowledge is not completely
developed under the South Carolina cases. There is one case
on the subject, however, which, though involving a mortgage
of personalty, involves similar principles. Gibbes Machinery
Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. 72 involved a situation where the
insurer knew of the existence of the mortgage through its
agent, but did not know that the mortgage contained a covenant to insure for the benefit of the mortgagee. The Court
held that in view of the fact that the mortgage was recorded,
the insurer was on constructive notice of the provision of
the mortgage, and hence his payment of the proceeds subject
to a lien to the mortgagor-insured was no defense.
Not only are the insurance proceeds subject to an equitable
lien when there has been no change in the mortgagor's relation to the mortgage, but the equitable lien is not destroyed
if the mortgagor transfers to another and the grantee assumes the mortgage. This is the case even if the original
mortgagor failed to comply with his covenant to insure and
73
the first insurance taken out was by the grantee.
It should be noted that the above discussion is predicated

upon a duty of the mortgagor to insure for the benefit of the
mortgagee. This will probably be the usual situation, as the
mortgage form currently in use in South Carolina contains a
provision for the insurance of the property for the benefit
72. 119 S. C. 1, 111 S. E. 805 (1922).
73. Farmers' and Merchants' National Bank of Lake City v. Moore,
135 S. C. 391, 133 S. E. 913 (1926).
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of the mortgagee.7 4 Should there be no such requirement,
apparently there is no equitable lien, and the Court will not
raise the quasi-trust relationship as in the Clyburn and Green
cases. It should be remembered that the Court in the Swearingen case held on the fact that there was no binding agreement to insure for the benefit of the mortgagee, hence there
was no equitable lien. This result is further supported by the
case of Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer,7 5 where the Court refused to
impress a trust of the insurance proceeds on a donee for the
benefit of the creditors of the donor. The rationale of this
decision seems to be that the insurance contract is a personal
contract of indemnity, that the donee had a separate insurable interest, and that since the insurance proceeds did not
stand for the donated property it would be "inequitable" to
refuse to permit the donee the benefit of her contract of insurance. This case is cited fairly frequently in the reports,
and this writer thinks it must be regarded as settled that an
insurance contract will be regarded as personal, and that a
third person can not get the benefit of any proceeds, in the
absence of a covenant to insure or a quasi-trust raised by the
law.7 6
Vendor-Vendee. The law in South Carolina with respect

to a vendor-vendee relationship is in considerable doubt, and
no case has definitely decided how proceeds of insurance
should be allocated between the vendor and vendee. This
paper will simply examine what is deemed to be the general
rule in the United States and the South Carolina cases which
might bear on the subject.
The question to be decided is this. When there is an execu-

tory contract for the sale of real estate, and the property
is insured by either the vendor or the vendee, and before the
conveyance there is a destruction of the property, who is entitled to the proceeds of insurance? There are no South Carolina decisions directly on this point. If the vendor is the
person who has insured the property, and the insurance is
74. Form No. 1, "Mortgage of Real Estate," published by R. L. Bryan
Co., Stationers, Columbia, South Carolina.
75. 64 S. C. 413, 42 S. E. 184 (1902).
76. If the Mortgagee should insure for more than his interest, i. e.,
the value of the mortgage debt, it is first doubtful that he would recover in full, despite the Hunt case, because of the Brant case. Second,
if he should recover the full amount, there seems to be no authority
in South Carolina as to whether he holds the excess above his mortgage
debt for the benefit of the mortgagor, with or without an agreement.
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carried in his name, as a general rule the one who bears the
risk of loss seems to be entitled to the proceeds of the insurance. 77 This risk of loss may be fixed by the contract, or in
the absence of contract provision it may be fixed by law. A
minority view seems to hold that even where the risk of loss
is on the vendee, the vendor is entitled to the proceeds of
insurance.7 8 The majority view's rationale is that the property has passed by the doctrine of equitable conversion to the
vendee, that the insurance proceeds "stand for" the property,
and that therefore the vendee, not the vendor, is entitled to
them. 79 The minority retains the theory that an insurance
policy is a personal contract of indemnity, in which the vendee, not being a party to the contract, has no rightso
When the insurance is procured by the vendee in his own
name, the cases hold that the vendee is entitled to the insurance proceeds. 81 In situations where the vendor's policy
has been assigned to the vendee, the vendee is entitled to the
proceeds. 82 Where the vendee maintains insurance in the vendor's name, the vendor is entitled to offset the proceeds
against the balance of the purchase price due. 83 Perhaps these
last two situations can be explained as involving a situation
where the insurance contract furnished strong evidence of an
intention that the risk of loss was intended to fall on the person for whose benefit the insurance is procured, and hence
fall into the category of cases where an intention of where the
risk of loss was to fall was manifested by the parties to the
contract.
It is this writer's opinion that the disposition of the proceeds will turn on two factors. First, if the courts adopt
the view that an insurance contract is simply a personal contract of indemnity, the courts will not award the proceeds to
anyone but the named insured, or his assignee regardless of
risk of loss. Second, if the courts recede from this view and
hold that the proceeds stand for the property destroyed, the
disposition of the proceeds will depend on which party bears
the risk of loss.
77. Annotation, 37 A. L. R. 1324 (1925).
78. Annotation, 37 A. L. R. 1324, 1326 (1925).
79. Milville Aerie v. Weatherby, 82 N. J. Eq. 455, 88 AtI. 847 (1913).
80. Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630
(1925).
81. Annotation, 37 A. L. R. 1324, 1331 (1925).
82. Annotation, 37 A. L. R. 1324, 1327 (1925).
83. Annotation, 37 A. L. R. 1324, 1328 (1925).
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It will be remembered that the South Carolina Court takes
what might be called an intermediate view of the insurance
contract. 84 The Court has several times reaffirmed its view
that an insurance contract is a personal contract, but it has
also held in a few instances that where there is a duty to insure for a third person, or where there is a fiduciary relation
to the third person, the proceeds of the personal contract of
indemnity will be held for the benefit of the third person. The
question then becomes, will the South Carolina Court raise a
trust for the benefit of the other party to a contract for the
sale of land when one party has insured and there has been no
agreement to insure? To answer this question, it is necessary
first to determine which party bears the burden of the risk of
loss while a contract for the sale of land is executory.
There are surprisingly few cases on this question in the
one hundred and seventy-three years of reported cases in
South Carolina history. One of the earliest seems to be
Hu.quenin v. Courtenay.8 5 This case involved a contract for
the sale of a leasehold interest in a beach front lot. Prior to
the conveyance, the property was partly washed away by an
ocean storm. The vendor sued for specific performance on
the ground that the equitable title to the leasehold interest was
in the vendee and consequently the risk of loss fell on the
vendee. The Court refused to grant specific performance.
It found that the well established doctrine in South Carolina
was that a contract for the transfer of a leasehold interest
was not specifically enforceable when the subject matter was
destroyed. The Court said that this was the rule after a lessor
had entered into possession and a fortiori should be the rule
if the property was destroyed before entering the land. This
case, thus, did not really establish what would be the result
if the vendor owned the property in the instant case in fee
simple and the contract were therefore specifically enforceable.
8 6 This case
A later case is the case of Good v. Jarrard.
involved a contract for the sale of a building and lot, half of
the purchase price to be paid at a specified date at which time
the conveyance was to be made, and half was to be paid one
year later. The property was subject to a mortgage which
was to be paid off when the first half of the purchase price
84. See text at p. 270 supra.

85. 21 S. C. 403 (1884).
86. 93 S. C. 229, 76 S. E. 698 (1912).
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was paid. The building was destroyed prior to the first payment and conveyance. The vendor sued for specific performance of the contract. The Court in a 3-2 decision denied specific performance, holding that in this situation the vendor
bore the risk of loss. The reasons given for the holding are
numerous. Part of the opinion indicates that since at the time
of the fire the plaintiff could not have delivered a fee simple
title, the decree was not specifically enforceable. The Court
also speaks as if the vendor were at fault in not protecting
against loss by procuring fire insurance. In another part of
the opinion, the decision seems to turn on the fact that the
purchaser had not gone into possession.87 The case has been
cited most frequently as holding that as a general rule the
vendor has the risk of loss, regardless of these other circumstances.88 This is also the view of the holding taken by the
dissenting Justices in the Good case itself. Mr. Justice Woods
delivered a very able dissenting opinion89 in which he showed
how under the doctrine of equitable conversion the vendee
was treated as owner of the property for numerous purposes
in South Carolina law. He deplored the fact that the case departed from the overwhelming weight of English and American precedent. As a final note to this case Mr. Justice Cothran, dissenting, in Davenport v. Collins,9 ° a case involving the

construction of a codicil to a will, made this remark about
Good v. Jarrard: "In view of the divergence of opinion on the
question, the very able dissenting opinion of Justice Woods,
and the elaborate array of authorities sustaining the dissent,
appearing in a note to McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309,
186 N. W. 74, 22 A. L. R. 567, the principle announced in
Good v. Jarrardcannot be said to be firmly established in this
State." It is therefore this writer's opinion that it is not
settled in South Carolina which party, vendor or vendee, has
the risk of loss in the absence of an agreement.
If it were clear which party had the risk of loss, it might
well be argued that the Court would raise a quasi-trust relationship for the benefit of that party, with respect to the
insurance proceeds. Of course, if the contract of sale itself
87. See the various views for which this case is cited in Annotation,
27 A. L. R. 2d 446, 447, 453, 458, and 468 (1953).
88. McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74, 22 A. L. R. 563
(1921).
89. 93 S. C. at 242, 76 S. E. at 703.
90. 161 S. C. 387, 442, 159 S. E. 787, 806 (1931).
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settles the question of risk of loss and the contract is complied
with as to procuring insurance, it will be enforced and there
will be no problem. If the contract with respect to insurance
is not complied with, the Court may impose something analogous to the equitable lien imposed when the mortgagor has the
duty to insure for the mortgagee. 9 1
If the contract says nothing with respect to the risk of loss,
and the law says nothing, will there ever be a quasi-trust
or lien imposed? The answer to this question, insofar as it has
been decided at all, seems to be affirmative. In Good V. Jarrard, the vendor was in possession by his lessee. In enumerating nine reasons why the vendor had a duty to insure the
property, the Court said :92
"3. The insurable interest of the vendee was negligible,
being merely the difference between the value of the land
and the agreed price, while the vendor's insurable interest was sufficient to have protected her [vendor] from
financial loss. The insurance of the property would, also,
have resulted in the protection of the vendee." (Emphasis added.)
Does this mean that if the vendor had insured the vendee
would have had a right to demand specific performance and
reach the proceeds?
Another dictum appears in Milhous v. Globe & Rutgers Fire
Ins. Co.0 3 In that case the vendor took out a policy with one
company for $3,000 and the vendee a policy with the defendant for $1,500. The property was burned. The vendor collected on its policy. The defendant said that since the "property" was valued at $3,000 and since the vendor had collected
that amount, the vendee could not collect on its policy. The
Court held, however, that the valuation in the policy referred
to the interest of the insured and hence the vendee could
recover the full $1,500 from the insurer.9 4 Mr. Justice Cothran concurred in the result, and in the course of his opinion
91. The writer has been unable to find any case in which one party
was obliged by a covenant to insure, and in which the Court imposed
an equitable lien on his insurance recovery when he failed to insure.
But the case is analogous to the mortgagor-mortgagee situation, in
which a lien was imposed.
92. 93 S. C. at 239, 76 S. E. at 702.
93. 161 S. C. 96, 159 S. E. 506 (1931).
94. This case is apparently a case where the Court held that the insurer knew of the plaintiff's limited interest and therefore was deemed
to have waived the right to declare the policy null and void.
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he says " ... when the vendor is in possession, it becomes his
duty to have the property insured, and ... such insurance
inures to the protection of the vendee as well as of himself.
It follows therefore that the insurance taken out by the vendee
in possession inures to the protection of the vendor as well as
of himself." 95 It thus seems that there may well be a trust
imposed or a lien on the proceeds for the benefit of the uninsured party to the executory sale of land contract not in
possession, even though the insurance contract is silent as to
insurance and risk of loss.96 As yet, however, this result has
not been expressed in the cases.
Landlord-Tenant. Apparently there have been no cases decided in South Carolina involving the division of proceeds of
insurance between landlord and tenant. In view of this fact,
this writer will state the general rule applicable in most U. S.
jurisdictions and comment on to what extent he thinks it will
be received in South Carolina.
If there is no agreement between landlord and tenant as to
insurance, neither party can recover from the other a portion
of the proceeds of the other's insurance contract. The courts,
in other words, do not raise a quasi-trust between the landlord
and tenant. 9" This rule will probably be followed in South
Carolina, since the Court is somewhat reluctant to raise the
kind of trust it raised in Green and Clyburn. But conceivably
in some situations, for example where the tenant builds a
building which is to go to the landlord at the termination of
the lease, the Court might find this sufficiently analogous to
a life tenant-remainderman situation as to raise a trust.

If there is an agreement to insure, the proceeds in most
jurisdictions are divided between lessor and lessee in accord
with the interest of each.98 The courts, in other words, raise an
equitable lien on the proceeds where there is an agreement to
insure. This is opposed by a minority of jurisdictions, which
95. 161 S. C. at 104, 159 S. E. at 508.

96. This is not to say that the person who is not in possession fortui-

tously gets the benefit because he is not in possession. But it is to say

that the Court would probably divide the proceeds according to the
damages each persons sustains. In this way both the party in possession
and the party out of possession would receive some benefit. If both

vendor and vendee insured it is doubtful that there would be any division, as the dicta in the cited cases seem to be predicated on only one
person insuring.

97. Annotation, 66 A. L. R. 864 (1930).

98. Annotation, 66 A. L. R. 864, 866 (1930).
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hold to the personal contract rationale.9 9 The South Carolina
Court will probably follow the majority in this, since it is
entirely consistent with the equitable lien in the case of mortgage proceeds raised when there was an agreement to insure.
Conclusion
This paper has primarily attempted to study the South Carolina law as to the apportionment of proceeds of insurance between the insured and persons who have interests in the insured subject matter but who are not parties to the insurance
contract. In order to do this, it was first necessary to see if a
situation could ever exist, under the presently used "interest"
policy, in which the insured would recover more than the
value of his interest. This was necessary because only if the
insured can recover more than the value of his interest, can
the problem of apportionment ever arise. It was found that,
in addition to cases where the insurer chooses not to contest
the overinsurance, the valued policy statute of South Carolina
prevents his protesting that the property was overinsured.
This result is not immediately apparent on the face of the
statute, but has been reached over the years in cases involving
the "res" policy, and has recently been reaffirmed in a case
involving the "interest" policy.
Having concluded that the insured might, on occasion, recover more than the value of his interest, the paper then considered the law on the apportionment of proceeds in four
basic property relationships, viz., life tenant-remainderman,
mortgagor-mortgagee, vendor-vendee, lessor-lessee.
In the life tenant-remainderman situation, when the life
tenant insures, the Court imposes a trust on his recovery for
the benefit of the remainderman, regardless of whether there
was a requirement to insure. Perhaps the same result would
have been reached if only the remainderman insures.
When the relationship is that of mortgagor-mortgagee, and
there is no agreement to insure, the mortgagee can reach the
proceeds of the other either in the hands of the mortgagor or
in the hands of the insurer. But if there was an agreement
for the mortgagor to insure for the benefit of the mortgagee,
the Court gives the mortgagee an equitable lien against the
proceeds if they have been paid to the mortgagor or if they
are still in the hands of the insurer. But if the insurer has
99. Annotation, 66 A. L. R. 864, 866 (1930).
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paid the mortgagor without notice of the lien, it is a defense.
If the mortgagee insured for an amount in excess of his value,
the result is doubtful.
If one party is a vendor and the other is a vendee, and
there is no agreement as to insurance or risk of loss, the recovery of either one will probably be divided with the other,
depending on the loss to each. And if there is an agreement
to insure, the result would probably be the same as in the case
of a mortgage, that is, there would be a lien to enforce the
agreement.
Finally, if one party is a lessor and the other is a lessee,
and there is no agreement as to insurance, each contract of
insurance will probably be regarded as a personal contract
of indemnity and the other interested person will have no
rights under it since he is not a party to the contract. But if
there is an agreement to insure, it will probably be enforced by
the device of the equitable lien.
If the other interested person not a party to the insurance
contract has procured insurance on his own it is doubtful that
he can get any recovery from the proceeds of the first party's
recovery.
Thus the South Carolina Supreme Court has persisted in

regarding the insurance contract as primarily a personal contract of indemnity between the insurer and the insured. Yet
in certain situations, which seem to occur when the party who
is benefited either would not normally think of insuring his
interest or has been lulled into not insuring by actions of the
insured, the Court will impose a quasi-trust or an equitable
lien for the benefit of a person interested in the property insured but who is not a party to the insurance contract.
APPENDIX
(Code of Laws of South Carolina)
(1952)
§ 37-154. Maximum amounts of policies; stated valued; company contributions.
No company writing fire insurance policies, doing business
in this State, shall issue a policy for more than the value
stated in the policy or the value of the property to be insured,
the amount of insurance to be fixed by the insurer and insured
at or before the time of issuing the policy. In case of total loss
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by fire the insured shall be entitled to recover the full amount
of insurance and in case of a partial loss the insured shall be
entitled to recover the actual amount of the loss, but in no
event more than the amount of the insurance stated in the
contract. But if two or more policies are written upon the
same property they shall be deemed and held to be contributive
insurance and if the aggregate sum of all such insurance exceeds the insurable value of the property, as agreed by the
insurer and the insured, each company shall, in the event of
a total or partial loss, be liable for its pro rata share of insurance. Nothing in this section shall be held to apply to insurance on chattels or personal property.
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